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Since the 1990s, China has increasingly integrated into a globalized economy by attracting a large amount 
of foreign direct investment (FDI). But from the mid-2000s, the government began to vigorously support 
the development of indigenous innovation such that some Chinese firms, such as Huawei and ZTE, have 
emerged as global technology leaders. However, even within the same industry and among localities at 
similar levels of development and FDI dependence in China, domestic upgrading has not been equally 
successful. In Manipulating Globalization, Ling Chen argues that such variation in the implementation of 
upgrading policies and policy effectiveness is attributed to the coalitions formed at the local level between 
Chinese bureaucrats and foreign businesses. She finds that cities that initially focused on attracting large-
scale, high-end multinational companies (MNCs) are less able to effectively implement policies for 
upgrading domestic firms than those that started with smaller foreign investors at a lower position of the 
value chain. By unpacking the interests and strategies of city-level bureaucrats, the book provides novel 
insights into China’s local political economy in the context of contemporary globalization. 
To assess China’s industrial policies promoting domestic upgrading, Chen impressively uses original 
data collected from in-depth fieldwork as well as national statistics and firm surveys. She shows that unlike 
earlier developmental states in East Asia (e.g. Japan) that limited the entrance of foreign capital, foreign 
investment was intertwined with local politics in China to generate heterogenous outcomes regarding the 
technology upgrading of domestic firms across localities. The book starts with a detailed analysis of the 
paradigm shift in China’s development strategies from FDI attraction in the 1990s (Chapter 2) to indigenous 
innovation in the mid-2000s (Chapter 3). Based on her fieldwork, Chen identifies two typical models of 
investment-seeking Chinese municipalities: those favoring large top-ranked MNCs in the Yangtze River 
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Delta like Suzhou and those favoring small-scale foreign firms in the Pearl River Delta represented by 
Shenzhen.  
The book then provides outstanding mixed-method research showing that early choices made by city-
level bureaucrats on the types of foreign investors determined the degree of local governments’ support for 
domestic upgrading (Chapter 4) and the effectiveness of upgrading policies in terms of driving domestic 
firms’ technology upgrading and innovation (Chapter 5). On the divergence in local governments’ support, 
Chen argues that the combination of high overlap between foreign firms and exporters and high 
concentration of foreign firms in a city is likely to generate a cohesive and strong vested interest group led 
by international commerce departments to prevent domestic upgrading. At the firm level, she finds that, in 
cities that attracted large-scale, top-ranked MNCs, domestic firms often stay in the lower segment of the 
production chain, and consequently are less likely to engage in upgrading and to respond to government 
support for technology innovation. Furthermore, Chapter 6 explores the deep roots of local bureaucrats’ 
preferences through the lens of varieties of local capitalism. Differentiating between the top-down 
capitalism in Jiangsu driven by political purposes and the bottom-up capitalism in Guangdong driven by 
practical economic gains, Chen argues that local norms and institutions have, since the late 19th century, 
conditioned and reinforced  bureaucrats’ choices of business allies and development strategies, which have 
in turn shaped divergent paths of industrial upgrading over the last two decades.  
The book makes a very compelling argument about the influence of local bureaucrats on the 
implementation of state-led industrial policies and their effectiveness. It thus joins many previous studies 
to uncover fragmented authoritarianism, but also sheds new light on the interaction between foreign 
investment and local bureaucratic competition and the relevant path dependencies. In praising Chen’s fine-
grained analysis, one can identify two additional factors that may consolidate or undermine her findings. 
First, the book discusses the rise of a new paradigm of domestic upgrading led by the central state, but does 
not consider if, under certain circumstances, the central government is willing to directly intervene at the 
local level to support this new development strategy. Research has shown that in some industries—
especially those identified as strategically important, the central state’s regulation has remained influential 
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such that industrial policies from Beijing have direct impact on enterprises.1 This could be also happen in 
some manufacturing industries and even for some technologies in the electronics sector covered by the 
book. Hence, a related alternative hypothesis is that localities like Shenzhen were chosen by the central 
government as hubs of indigenous innovation. Even if they were not chosen in the first place, their initial 
rise may attract more support from the top and accordingly reinforce their position as a champion of 
domestic upgrading. It is thus worth further examining the central government’s responses to uneven 
success of domestic upgrading and how they may affect preexisting policy outcomes.  
Second, by focusing on the interests and strategies of local bureaucrats, Chen seems to pay less attention 
to the agency of foreign investors. In addition to preferences of local governments, other factors may also 
play important roles in the choices of foreign investors. Large MNCs may prefer to invest in Jiangsu simply 
due to its better industrial base and human resources while guerilla investors flourish in Guangdong thanks 
to family ties. Accordingly, subsequent interactions between foreign investors and local bureaucrats may 
be more complex than is showed in the book. In other words, the preferences of local bureaucrats may not 
be predetermined but gradually formed and strengthened by learning processes like their interaction with 
civil society groups as discovered by Jessica Teets.2 To further examine such processes, we need to draw 
more on insights from of businesses – micro-level research along this line can also strengthen the argument 
on the path dependence of local capitalism in Chapter 6.  
Manipulating Globalization provides an important update on local political economy in contemporary 
China and therefore is a must read for students of Chinese politics and comparative political economy. 
Despite focusing on the era of Hu-Wen, the insights generated by the book may still have important 
implications in coming decades. Given Xi Jinping’s recentralization policy, this study may trigger a new 
line of literature interrogating the tensions between the long tradition of local capitalism and an increasingly 
strong central state in China’s economic policymaking. 
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